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Abstract 
We examined the role of sympathy, guilt, and moral reasoning in helping, cooperation, and 
sharing, in a six-year, three wave longitudinal study involving 175 children (Mages of 6.10, 9.18, 
and 12.18 years). Primary caregivers reported on children’s helping and cooperation; sharing 
was assessed behaviorally. Child sympathy was assessed by self- and teacher-reports, and self-
attributed feelings of guilt/sadness and moral reasoning were assessed by children’s responses 
to transgression vignettes. Sympathy predicted helping, cooperation, and sharing. Guilt/sadness 
and moral reasoning interacted with sympathy in predicting helping and cooperation; both 
sympathy and guilt/sadness were associated with the development of sharing. The findings are 
discussed in relation to the emergence of differential motivational pathways to helping, 
cooperation, and sharing. 
 Keywords: Helping, cooperation, sharing, sympathy, guilt, moral reasoning, 
longitudinal study 
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Children’s Sympathy, Guilt, and Moral Reasoning in Helping, Cooperation, and Sharing:  
A Six-Year Longitudinal Study 
 Over the past several decades, much research in developmental psychology has focused 
on gaining a deeper understanding of the factors that motivate children to engage in prosocial 
actions (Eisenberg, Spinrad, & Knafo-Noam, 2015). Developmental theorists have argued that 
both other-oriented moral emotions, such as sympathy, self-evaluative moral emotions, such as 
guilt, and moral reasoning can serve as motives for moral and prosocial behaviors (Hoffman, 
2000; Malti, 2015). While recent studies have shown that even young children exhibit 
spontaneous prosocial behavior (e.g., Dunfield, Kuhlmeier, O’Connell, & Kelley, 2011), it has 
been argued that these early other-oriented tendencies are likely caused by various, and not 
necessarily inherently moral, motives (Paulus, 2014). Emotions and thoughts about the self and 
others in everyday moral interactions, however, increase in frequency and complexity in early 
and middle childhood, and they may serve as important motives for truly other-oriented 
tendencies in these encounters. Here we focus on three central motives that have been theorized 
to underlie other-oriented tendencies across middle childhood: Children’s other-oriented feelings 
of sympathy for others in distress, children’s self-evaluative feelings of guilt about omitting 
prosocial duties, and children’s moral reasoning following moral judgment, as it reflects an 
internalized understanding about norms of justice, fairness, and care (Malti & Ongley, 2014).  
 It is important to investigate various types of moral emotions in relation to behavior as 
they are not all equal: The orientation of these emotions (i.e., other- vs. self-orientation) may 
contribute to their differential motivating roles. For instance, when the other-oriented emotion is 
weak, the self-evaluative emotion may compensate (as might moral reasoning) in motivating 
prosocial behavior. Furthermore, increasing social-cognitive skills may also increase the 
Moral Foundations of Prosocial Behavior  4 
multifaceted associations between these emotions and reasoning across middle childhood 
(Hoffman, 2000), as children increasingly coordinate their affective reactions with their 
justifications about moral transgressions (Aksan & Kochanska, 2005). Thus, various moral 
emotions and moral reasoning can highlight the moral norms involved in a transgression and thus 
serve to motivate other-oriented behavior. Most existing research, however, has focused on the 
role of either sympathy or guilt and moral reasoning on global indices of dispositional prosocial 
behavior. Relatively little is known about their independent and interdependent roles in 
predicting distinct subtypes of prosocial responding. Moreover, longitudinal work in this area 
that focuses on middle childhood is even sparser.  
 The present study aimed to address these research gaps, in part, by testing the role of 
other-oriented (i.e., sympathy) and self-evaluative moral emotions (i.e., guilt), and moral 
reasoning as motivational antecedents of distinct subtypes of prosocial behavior (i.e., helping, 
cooperation, and sharing) in a six-year, three-wave sample using a multi-method, multi-
informant approach. 
The Development of Helping, Cooperation, and Sharing  
 In the present study, we investigated the development of three subtypes of prosocial 
behavior (i.e., helping, cooperating, and sharing). These three behaviors were selected because 
together they represent a broad range of prosocial responding and yet they differ along three key 
dimensions: Goal achievement, cost, and anonymity (Eisenberg et al., 2015). Cooperation (i.e., 
coordinating one’s actions to reach a shared goal with another) differs from helping (i.e., aiding 
individuals who have suffered negative consequences) because the goal of cooperation is mutual. 
Helping, on the other hand, requires the helper to work towards the achievement of another 
individual’s goal, and to temporarily put aside the achievement of his or her own goals. Like 
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helping, sharing, which is operationalized in the current study as the costly and non-reciprocated 
allocation of personal resources, benefits the recipient and, when conducted in private, does not 
further the goals of the sharer. On the dimension of cost, cooperation is the least costly as it has 
mutually beneficial outcomes, followed by helping, which could potentially incur a high cost but 
most often costs the helper little effort (e.g., helping to pick up dropped items). As with helping 
and cooperation, acts of sharing take many forms, which can influence its cost. In some contexts, 
sharing can be a low cost prosocial behavior. For example, during public acts of sharing when 
the value of the shared item is low or the cost of the shared item is offset with a positive 
evaluation of the sharer. In some contexts, it may also be the case that the shared item is returned 
or, if one knows the recipient, the act of sharing may be reciprocated in future interactions. The 
current study, however, examined a particularly high-cost context for sharing; that is, resource 
sharing in which the shared items are a) perceived as valuable, b) are not returned, and c) are 
shared with anonymous strangers, which eliminates the possibility for future reciprocity 
(Gummerum, Hanoch, Keller, Parsons, & Hummel, 2010). Helping, cooperation, and sharing 
also diverge in their degree of anonymity. While all three can be public (and cooperation, by 
definition, must be), sharing in the current study is done anonymously with no opportunity for 
public recognition or reciprocity.  
Developmentally, children are able to engage in instrumental helping from early on (i.e., 
18 months). Cooperative behaviors are displayed early on in development, and appear to increase 
between the first and second year of life along with the development of communicative abilities. 
While children can exhibit sharing from as early as 8 months of age, sharing in equal amounts 
has been shown to emerge later in early childhood (Eisenberg et al., 2015). However, few studies 
have examined the development of these behaviors from middle childhood to early adolescence, 
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a time when peer relations become increasingly important and children may become more 
selective toward whom they behave prosocially (Berndt, 1985; Smetana, Killen, & Turiel, 1991; 
Weller & Lagatutta, 2012). 
 Helping in general is likely to increase from early childhood to early adolescence, 
although researchers have argued that while simple forms of helping may remain stable, more 
sophisticated forms of helping increase with age (Eisenberg et al., 2015). Although few 
longitudinal studies have examined the development of cooperation, it has been shown that 
social competence increases from childhood to adolescence, which is likely explained by 
children’s increased tendency to engage in peer interactions (Rubin, Bukowski, & Laursen, 
2011). Given that cooperation is a core component of social competence, it is reasonable to 
assume its increase (Laible, Carlo, Murphy, Augustine, & Roesch, 2014). The cross-sectional 
literature on sharing indicates an increase from early to middle childhood (Benenson, Pascoe, & 
Radmore, 2007). It is less clear whether sharing continues to increase from late-childhood to 
early adolescence; however, it is possible that during this period, children may be less likely to 
give their own possessions away due to their increased awareness of “ownership” (Hay, Caplan, 
Castle, & Stimson, 1991; see Nancekivell, Van de Vondervoort, & Friedman, 2013).  
Sympathy, Guilt, and the Development of Helping, Cooperation, and Sharing 
Developmental researchers have identified the other-oriented emotion of sympathy (i.e., 
affective concern for another’s well-being) and the self-evaluative emotion of guilt (i.e., sadness 
and negative feeling of regret over wrongdoing) as central motives in the development of 
prosocial behavior (Eisenberg et al., 2015; Malti & Ongley, 2014); however these moral 
emotions may motivate other-oriented, prosocial behavior for different reasons. Sympathy 
highlights the negative affective consequences for the victim, which likely facilitates the need to 
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help the distressed other. Guilt, on the other hand, entails negative feelings of regret and sadness 
about the self because it assumes that one has caused harm and has violated one’s own moral 
standards, which is likely to enhance reparation (Hoffman, 2000). In line with previous research 
in the happy-victimizer paradigm (see Arsenio, 2014; Malti & Ongley, 2014), we defined guilt 
feelings as the verbal attribution of guilt and sadness to the self as victimizer in the context of 
moral transgression. The verbal attribution of sadness to the self has been interpreted as an 
empirical indicator for the more complex emotion of guilt, because it reflects an internalized 
understanding of the norm’s validity, as well as one’s willingness to assume responsibility. This 
conceptualization is also in line with related literature on the development of complex social 
emotions, which has revealed that the attribution of basic emotions (e.g., sadness) can serve as a 
developmental precursor to the anticipation of complex social emotions (e.g., guilt) in vignette 
tasks (Malti et al., 2009; see Colonnesi, Engelhard, & Boegels, 2010). 
There is some evidence supporting an association between sympathy and helping in 
preschool and school-aged children, determined by facial reactions (Miller, Eisenberg, Fabes, & 
Shell, 1996) and physiological measures of sympathy (Eisenberg, Fabes, Miller, Shell, Shea, & 
May-Plumee, 1990); however, only a small body of existing work has documented a positive 
relation between guilt and helping behavior (Chapman, Zahn-Waxler, Cooperman, & Iannotti, 
1987). Regarding cooperation and sympathy, while Marcus, Tellen, and Roke (1979) found that 
preschoolers demonstrating high levels of cooperation also had higher levels of sympathy, 
Levine and Hoffman (1975) did not document relations between sympathy and cooperation 
among 4-year-olds. However, the related literature on social competence has shown positive 
longitudinal relations between sympathy and social competence (Sallquist, Eisenberg, Spinrad, 
Eggum & Gaertner, 2009). Furthermore, little is known about the relation between cooperation 
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and guilt; however, recent research has demonstrated a positive relation between sharing, guilt, 
and sympathy. For example, Gummerum and colleagues (2010) showed that 3- to 5-year-olds’ 
guilt significantly predicted sharing. Ongley and Malti (2014) found that for children with low 
sympathy, guilt predicted higher levels of sharing, suggesting that children with low levels of 
other-oriented concern (i.e., sympathy) may be motivated to share by negative self-evaluative 
moral emotions. Taken together, relatively little is known about how sympathy and guilt relate 
differentially to various prosocial behaviors, and longitudinal evidence is needed to paint a more 
complete picture of these associations.  
Moral Reasoning and the Development of Helping, Cooperation, and Sharing 
 Moral reasoning describes the process in which individuals, using logic and self-
reflection, determine why a specific act is right or wrong from a moral perspective (Malti & 
Ongley, 2014). This self-reflective process involves the capacity to distinguish self-oriented 
desires and needs from internalized norms of fairness, justice, and care. As such, moral reasoning 
includes fairness-related and other-oriented considerations as to why it is important to behave 
morally. In line with this notion, previous research has considered arguments that indicate both 
self-reflective morality, such as fairness, and other-oriented concerns of care, such as altruism 
and empathy, as part of overt moral reasoning (e.g., Malti, Gummerum, Keller, & Buchmann, 
2009). Cognitive-developmental approaches to moral development have claimed a positive 
relation between moral reasoning and morally relevant, prosocial behaviors (Kohlberg, 1984). 
Yet, findings from empirical studies have yielded an inconsistent picture, with small to modest 
positive relations at best (Eisenberg et al., 2015). Theoretically, it is likely that the internalization 
of moral norms and knowledge about why it is wrong from a moral perspective to not fulfill 
prosocial duties is related to the performance of prosocial behaviors themselves. Yet, the body of 
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research examining the role of moral reasoning in the motivation of specific subtypes of 
prosocial behavior has revealed mixed findings (Eisenberg-Berg & Hand, 1979; Gummerum, 
Keller, Takezawa, & Mata, 2008). To the best of our knowledge, only one study has documented 
a positive association between children’s moral reasoning and their cooperation with their 
mothers (Hinnant, Nelson, O'Brien, Keane, & Calkins, 2013). In addition, Miller and colleagues 
(1996) provided evidence that higher levels of other-oriented moral reasoning and sympathy 
predicted increased helping in early childhood. However, in light of the often small and 
inconsistent findings in this area, researchers have highlighted the need for work that explores 
the interplay between moral reasoning, sympathy, and guilt in prosocial behavior (Malti & 
Ongley, 2014).  
The Present Study 
 In sum, the purpose of the present study was twofold: (1) To study the developmental 
trajectories of helping, cooperation, and sharing from 6 to 12 years of age; and (2) to test the 
independent and combined role of sympathy, guilt, and moral reasoning in these behaviors. We 
expected increases in helping and cooperation (Eisenberg et al., 2015), whereas no change in 
sharing was expected (Almås, Cappelen, Sørensen, & Tungodden, 2010). In line with prior 
research (Eisenberg et al., 2015), we hypothesized that sympathy would predict the development 
of helping, cooperation, and sharing. In addition, we explored the possibility that guilt and moral 
reasoning would compensate for low levels of sympathy in predicting helping, cooperation, and 
sharing (Ongley & Malti, 2014), and that the strength of these relationships would vary across 
behaviors as they differ in terms of cost and orientation towards others (Eisenberg & Miller, 
1987). Specifically, sharing, being the most high-cost and other-oriented (i.e., with the least 
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potential self-gains) of the three measured prosocial behaviors, may yield the strongest 
associations with sympathy, guilt and moral reasoning.  
Method 
Participants 
A random sample of children and their primary caregivers was drawn in Switzerland. 
Interviews were conducted at T1 with 175 children (Mage = 6.10, SD = 0.19, 51% male) and 175 
caregivers. One hundred and sixty-three of the primary caregivers (93%) and 133 of the teachers 
(76%) filled out a supplementary questionnaire. At the second assessment (T2, 3 years after T1), 
141 interviews and 139 interviews were carried out with children (Mage = 9.18, SD = 0.61) and 
primary caregivers, respectively (81% and 85%). One hundred and thirty four (96%) of the 
primary caregivers and one hundred and thirty (93%) of teachers filled out a questionnaire. At 
the third assessment (T3, 3 years after T2), 136 children (Mage = 12.18, SD = 0.21) and 135 
primary caregivers were interviewed (96% and 97%); 121 primary caregivers (90%) and 124 
teachers (95%) filled out a questionnaire. Overt retention rates were 81% and 79% at T2 and T3, 
respectively (for further information and missing data analyses, see online Appendices S1 & S2). 
Procedure 
There were two sessions for each child at T1, each lasting approximately 60 minutes: One 
at home and one at school. The primary caregiver and teacher filled out a questionnaire on the 
child’s social-emotional development. The second and third assessments were completed 3 and 6 
years later, respectively, using the same procedure as in T1. The interviewers were trained 
undergraduate psychology students. Written informed consent was obtained from the primary 
caregivers and teachers at all assessment points (for further information, see online Appendix 
S2). 
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Measures 
Helping. Primary caregivers rated children’s helping on a 6-point scale using 3 items taken 
from the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (Goodman, 1997) and the Social Behavior 
Questionnaire (Tremblay et al., 1991), e.g., “My child is helpful if someone is hurt, upset or 
feeling ill”. Cronbach’s α were .65 (T1), .83 (T2), and .71 (T3). 
Cooperation. Primary caregivers rated children’s cooperation on a 6-point scale using 3 
revised items taken from German versions of the Social Competence and Behavior Evaluation 
Scale (LaFreniere & Dumas, 1995) and the Social Skills Rating System (Gresham & Elliot, 
1990), e.g., “My child cooperates with peers in group activities”. Cronbach’s αs were .71 (T1), 
.65 (T2), and .64 (T3). 
Sharing. At T1-T3, sharing was assessed using the dictator game (Gummerum et al., 2008). This 
prosocial sharing task was developed for experimental economics. One person, the dictator, can 
unilaterally allocate resources to another anonymous person, the receiver. The receiver cannot 
reject an allocation offer and cannot punish or reciprocate any action by the dictator. Therefore, 
if dictators are interested in maximizing their self-gain, they would not offer any resources to the 
receivers. In line with previous work, (Benenson et al., 2007; Ongley & Malti, 2014), 6- and 9-
year-olds received 12 stickers, whereas 12-year-olds received 10 one-Swiss Franc coins. The 
decision to use money instead of stickers when participants were 12 years of age was made in 
consultation with other researchers in the field and in line with previous studies as it takes into 
account the fact that adolescents generally do not find stickers as attractive as do children (and 
vice versa) (Ongley & Malti, 2014). In line with previous studies (e.g., Gummerum et al., 2008), 
we used this script to explain the dictator game to the participants: " I would like to play a game 
with you now. This game is called the stickers (or money) game. In this game, you can give 
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stickers (or money) to yourself and to another child. This child is also a boy/girl and the same 
age as you. You won’t see the other child and you won’t know who this other child is." 
Proportional scores were created by computing the number of shared resources (e.g., 
stickers, coins) divided by the total number of resources received during the interview. Higher 
scores indicated more sharing.  
Sympathy. At T1 and T2, child’s sympathy was assessed by teacher ratings on a 6-point 
scale and child ratings on a 3-point scale using 5 items (Zhou, Valiente, & Eisenberg, 2003).  
Children heard the statements read aloud (e.g., “I often feel sorry for other children who are sad 
or in trouble”) and after each statement were asked whether the sentence describes him/her or 
not, and if so, how strongly. Children were asked to answer spontaneously and not think too long 
about their answers. Cronbach’s αs were .67 (T1) and .74 (T2) for child reports, and .92 (T1) and 
.97 (T2) for teacher reports. 
Guilt. At T1-T2, children’s guilt was assessed using two validated hypothetical vignettes 
on prosocial duty omission (i.e., not sharing, not helping; see online supplemental Appendix S1). 
We chose to focus on the omission of prosocial moral duties because we expected emotions to be 
closely related to behavior in this domain. Previous research indicates stronger relations between 
emotions with behavior within the same moral subdomain than across moral subdomains, such as 
intentional harm (Malti et al., 2009; see Colasante, Zuffianò, & Malti, 2015). After listening to 
the two stories, the children were asked to report their feelings (i.e., emotion attributed to the 
self-as-victimizer; “How would you feel afterwards if you had done what [victimizer] did?”).  
Coding of guilt. The emotions attributed to the self-as-victimizer were categorized as 
“happiness”, “sadness”, “fear”, “anger”, and “guilt”. In line with previous work and  because the 
majority of children attributed “sadness” to the self-as-victimizer, guilt and sadness were 
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combined into one category labelled “guilt/sadness” (Malti et al., 2009; Ongley & Malti, 2014). 
The categories of guilt and sadness were combined because the attribution of sadness has been 
interpreted as a precursor of guilt in the context of moral transgressions, when children are not 
yet able to verbally label it (Malti et al., 2009; see Appendix S1). Like children’s moral 
reasoning, the reported emotions were binary coded for analysis purposes (“1” indicating the 
presence and “0” indicating the absence of guilt/sadness). The scores were then aggregated 
across the two stories. Similar to previous findings, the majority of the children attributed sad 
feelings, and only a minority of children verbally attributed “guilt” at T1 and T2 (T1: 65% 
attributed sadness and 4% guilt; T2: 67% attributed sadness and 13% guilt; see Malti & Ongley, 
2014).  
Moral reasoning. At T1-T2, children’s moral reasoning was assessed using the same two 
validated hypothetical vignettes on prosocial duty omission that were used to assess guilt. After 
listening to the two stories, the children were asked for their moral reasoning (i.e., justification of 
rule validity, “Is it right or not right what the protagonist did? Why/why not?”). 
Coding of moral reasoning. In line with previous work, the vast majority of the children 
evaluated the two transgressions as morally wrong at T1 and T2 (T1: 90%; T2: 96%). Because 
we were interested in children’s reasoning for moral judgment, reasoning was scored as a 0 in 
the few instances when children responded that the transgression was “right”. Next, a validated 
coding system (Malti et al., 2009) was used to code justification of rule validity: (1) Moral-
fairness reasons (e.g., “It is not fair to not share”), (2) moral-empathic reasons (e.g., “The other 
child will be sad”), (3) sanction-oriented, external reasons (e.g., “The teacher may punish the 
child”), (4) hedonistic, self-interested reasons (e.g., “He just likes pencils so much”), and (5) 
unelaborated reasons (e.g., “Because he just did it”).  
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Two trained testers coded answers at each assessment point: 12% and 23% of the 
transcripts were first double-coded by the testers, with κs = .96, and .92 respectively (see 
appendix S1). All disagreements were discussed, resolved, and consensus was coded. In line 
with previous work and our conceptualization of morality as pertaining to norms of fairness, 
justice, and care (e.g., Malti et al., 2009, 2012), moral-fairness and moral-empathic reasons were 
combined into one overt category labeled “moral reasoning” (for more detail, see online 
Appendix S1). As such, the “moral reasoning” score reflects an individual’s internalized moral 
norms and values, and justifications pertaining to fairness and empathic concern reflect an 
individual’s awareness of the validity of such norms in the context of everyday moral conflict. 
The responses were then binary coded for analysis purposes, with “1” indicating the presence of 
moral reasoning and “0” indicating the absence of such reasoning. With few exceptions, the 
reasoning scores were significantly interrelated across stories at all assessment points, and mean 
scores were computed.  
Socioeconomic status. Socioeconomic status (SES) was based on coding the caregiver’s 
current profession and was then transformed into an International Socioeconomic Index of 
occupational status (ISEI) score. The final SES score was based on the caregiver with the highest 
ISEI score and was standardized for further analyses. 
Plan of Analyses 
 Unconditional Latent Growth Curve Modeling (LGCM) was used to identify 
developmental trajectories of helping and cooperation (see online Appendix S3) in Mplus 
version 7.31 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). Since helping and cooperation showed some moderate 
degree of shared variance (see online Appendix S4), we captured their unique, idysioncratic 
facets by employing an indicator-specific LGCM approach (Bishop, Geiser, & Cole, 2015). This 
Moral Foundations of Prosocial Behavior  15 
method allowed us to simultaneously model the development of both helping and cooperation 
while their shared variance was controlled for (see online Appendix S3, for a graphical 
representation). Next, eight conditional LGC models were implemented with moral emotions, 
moral reasoning, and the interaction terms (i.e., sympathy  guilt/sadness, sympathy  moral 
reasoning) at T1 and T2 predicting the initial levels (i.e., intercepts) and rates of change (i.e., 
slopes) of helping and cooperation (see online Appendix S3 for indices used to evaluate model 
fit). Sex and SES were covariates. In addition, we controlled for the effect of intercept on slope 
(i.e., the effects of initial levels of helping and cooperation on the change rates of helping and 
cooperation). Sharing was not correlated across time (see online Appendix S4), so that LGCM 
was not appropriate and multiple regression analyses were conducted instead.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Means, standard deviations, and correlations between the study variables are presented in 
Table 1 (for a more detailed description, see online Appendix S4). 
The Development of Helping, Cooperation, and Sharing 
Results showed that the unconditional linear model fit the data well for helping χ2 (6) = 
11.57, p = .07; CFI = .96, RMSEA = .07, SRMR = .06, and cooperation, χ2 (1) = 2.00, p = .16; 
CFI = .98, RMSEA = .08, SRMR = .02 (see online Appendix S3). While helping decreased over 
time, cooperation increased (Table 2). The variance of the latent slope of cooperation was 
significant, indicating inter-individual variability in the development of cooperation over time. 
Latent mean-level changes in sharing were not modeled, however repeated measures ANOVA 
indicated that children at age 12 shared less than children at age 9, but similarly to children at 
age 6 F(2, 242)= 5.26, p < .05, η2p = .04.  
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Sympathy, Guilt, and Moral Reasoning in Helping, Cooperation, and Sharing  
The eight conditional LGC models showed a reasonable fit to the data (see online 
Appendix S5) and results indicated that, overall, a substantial amount of variances of the 
intercepts and slopes was explained by the predictors for most of the models (Table 2). 
Helping. Teacher-reported sympathy at T1 predicted both the intercept and slope of 
helping above and beyond the effect of sex (girls declined slower than boys in helping): Higher 
levels of sympathy at 6 years of age were related to higher initial levels of helping and lower 
decreases in helping over time (Table 2). At T2, we found child-reported sympathy at T2 was 
positively associated with the intercept (Table 2). 
Cooperation. At T1, the intercept of cooperation was negatively related to the slope, 
indicating that children at age 6 starting with lower levels tended to increase more in 
cooperation. The interaction of teacher-reported sympathy and guilt/sadness significantly 
predicted the slope of cooperation (Table 2). Simple slope analysis revealed that, for children 
who were low in guilt/sadness, higher sympathy was associated with steeper increase in 
cooperation over time, whereas children who were high in guilt/sadness showed high level of 
cooperation over time, independent of their sympathy (Figure 1). At T1, child-reported sympathy 
interacted with guilt/sadness and moral reasoning in predicting the intercept (Table 2). Only for 
children who were low in guilt/sadness or moral reasoning, higher sympathy was associated with 
higher cooperation, whereas higher guilt/sadness or moral reasoning was related to higher 
cooperation regardless of their sympathy (Figure 2). At T2, child-reported sympathy predicted 
the intercept positively whereas guilt/sadness was negatively associated with the slope, 
indicating that children who were already high in guilt/sadness showed less steep increases in 
cooperation from T2 to T3 (Table 2). 
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Sharing. The results showed no significant effects of sympathy, guilt/sadness, and moral 
reasoning on sharing at T1 concurrently or in predicting sharing at T2. However, teacher-
reported sympathy and guilt/sadness at T2 predicted sharing at T2, β = 0.22, p = .01 and β = 
0.25, p = .005, respectively (R2 = 0.11). In addition, self-reported sympathy and guilt/sadness at 
T2 predicted sharing at T3, β = 0.19, p = .02 and β = 0.21, p = .045, respectively (R2 = 0.09). 
These results suggest that higher sympathy and guilt/sadness at 9 years of age were associated 
with more sharing at both 9 and 12 years of age. 
Discussion 
 This study is among the first to investigate the role of sympathy, guilt, and moral 
reasoning in the development of three distinct subtypes of prosocial behavior: Helping, 
cooperation, and sharing. We tested these relations comprehensively over a period of six years 
from early childhood to early adolescence, utilizing a multi-informant, mixed-method approach. 
Despite longstanding theorizing on the role of sympathy, guilt, and moral reasoning in overt 
prosocial behavior, longitudinal studies on various subtypes of prosocial behavior are sparse, and 
few, if any, have tested the role of moral-affective and moral-cognitive factors in the 
development of subtypes of prosocial behavior. The current study was thus well suited to add 
novel knowledge on the moral foundations of these types of prosocial behaviors.  
 One central finding was that sympathy was an important antecedent of all three prosocial 
behaviors from early childhood to early adolescence. We found that sympathy predicted higher 
levels of helping, cooperation, and sharing, as well as mean-level change rates of helping (from 6 
to 12 years of age). Interestingly, teacher-reported sympathy, compared to self-reported 
sympathy, showed a more consistent pattern of associations across time with helping and 
cooperation. This result might be interpreted in light of the shared focus of adult reporters (i.e., 
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teachers and parents) on dispositional components when evaluating children's emotional and 
behavioral functioning, such as their sympathy or prosocial behavioral tendencies (De Los Reyes 
& Kazdin, 2005). In contrast, children may tend to include more contextual or situational 
information (e.g., specific reactions to peer provocations, etc.) when reporting their own feelings 
and behaviors. 
 Taken together, these findings resonate with the premise that sympathy (or affective 
concern for others) is a strong motivating factor behind other-oriented behaviors and their 
development (Davidov, Zahn-Waxler, Roth-Hanania, & Knafo, 2013). In moral development 
theory, it has been emphasized that affective concern for others serves as an important motivator 
for early prosocial behavior, and much longitudinal work has confirmed the role of sympathy in 
the development of overt prosocial behavior. Our findings extend these lines of work by 
documenting the significance of sympathy in the development of specific prosocial behaviors. 
A second important finding was that self-attributed feelings of guilt/sadness predicted 
higher levels of sharing from mid-childhood to early adolescence. This is particularly interesting 
because sharing, of the three prosocial behaviors, is the most costly. Unlike helping or 
cooperation, sharing involves the loss of the shared items (Gummerum et al., 2008). The role of 
self-attributed feelings of guilt/sadness in the development of sharing shows that sympathy is not 
the only motivator of costly prosocial actions, especially from mid-childhood to early 
adolescence. Sympathy may be particularly relevant in early childhood, given that young 
children have not yet developed the self-reflective skills that are necessary for the anticipation of 
guilt and sadness (Davidov et al., 2013). Thus, since the complex self-conscious emotion of guilt 
emerges later in development, self-attributed feelings of guilt/sadness may serve as a 
motivational foundation for sharing in mid-childhood and subsequent development by pointing 
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to the negative affective consequences of omitting fair resource allocation (Kochanska, Gross, 
Lin, & Nichols, 2002).  
A third main finding was that both moral reasoning and feelings of guilt/sadness 
interacted with sympathy in predicting cooperation. Specifically, there was an interaction 
between teacher-reported sympathy and guilt/sadness (at T1) in predicting changes in 
cooperation (see Figure 1). Children with low guilt/sadness showed more increases in 
cooperation if they were high in sympathy. This finding supports a compensatory mechanism 
between sympathy with guilt/sadness in predicting the development of cooperation (Malti et al., 
2009). We also found a similar compensatory effect between (a) child-reported sympathy and 
guilt/sadness at T1, and (b) child-reported sympathy and moral reasoning at T1 on initial mean 
levels of cooperation: Whereas children with high guilt/sadness (Figure 2a) or moral reasoning 
(Figure 2b) were high in cooperation at T1 independent of their sympathy, high levels of 
sympathy increased the cooperative behavior of 6-year-old children with low level of 
guilt/sadness or moral reasoning. Sympathy also increased the cooperative behavior of 9-year-
old children. In contrast, high guilt/sadness at T2 was associated with less steep increases in 
cooperation from T2 to T3. This finding may be due to the fact that both feelings of guilt/sadness 
and cooperation were already at high mean levels at T2, and high guilt/sadness may therefore not 
stimulate increases in cooperation from T2 to T3; rather, other factors may be necessary to enact 
steep increases in an already high willingness to cooperate.   
As expected, children shared less at 12-years of age compared to 9-years of age. Though 
the limited number of existing studies that have examined change in sharing from middle 
childhood to early adolescence have yielded conflicting findings (Leman, Keller, Takezawa, & 
Gummerum, 2009), this age-related decrease is consistent with previous findings for boys 
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between the ages of 8 and 12 and research showing a decrease between middle childhood and 
adolescence in sharing with non-friends (Berndt, 1985; Ongley & Malti, 2014).   
 We found developmental changes in children’s helping and cooperation. For helping, we 
found a somewhat unexpected decrease over time. Although our results also indicated that 
children with high initial levels of teacher-reported sympathy showed less decline in helping than 
their counterparts, the decrease may be a function of the type of helping behaviors that were 
measured in this study. Our measure captured rudimentary, instrumental forms of helping. Such 
behaviors are often enacted through contingent external rewards and may therefore decline with 
increasingly sophisticated socio-cognitive and socio-emotional skills. With age, children may 
increasingly engage in other, more complex forms of helping behaviors that are associated with, 
and motivated by, sympathy and altruistic concern (Eisenberg et al., 2015; see Svetlova, Nichols,  
& Brownell, 2010). Future longitudinal research can further clarify how different motives, such 
as external rewards or altruistic concern, predict the development of different types of helping. 
For cooperation, we found an increase over time, which is in line with previous work (Laible et 
al., 2014). Although rudimentary cooperative skills begin to emerge in early childhood 
(Warneken & Tomasello, 2007), cooperation requires complex understanding of interdependence 
among courses of actions (in order to reach a common desired goal) that likely develop later 
(Dunfield et al., 2011). 
In line with theorizing on the associations between sympathy, guilt/sadness and moral 
reasoning (Akzan & Kochanska, 2005), our correlational findings also showed associations 
between feelings of guilt/sadness and moral reasoning, suggesting that children’s internalized 
feelings about norms of caring are related to how they reason about these issues. Importantly, 
however, a consistent pattern of associations between sympathy and feelings of guilt/sadness did 
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not emerge, indicating that the development of self-evaluative emotions and other-oriented 
emotions of empathy/sympathy may follow distinct pathways (Malti & Ongley, 2014). Future 
research is needed to validate the distinct developmental trajectories of sympathy and guilt. 
Despite its novel focus and the longitudinal, multi-informant, multi-method design, this 
study had several limitations. First, our dependent measures did not systematically assess various 
targets of helping, cooperation and sharing. Existing evidence suggests that children’s helping 
and sharing vary depending on their relationship with the target (Paulus & Moore, 2014). 
Second, the strength of the relation between moral development and prosocial behaviors may 
depend on the cost. While our behaviors varied by cost, systematic variation of cost within each 
behavior domain may reveal important similarities and differences in relation to moral cognition 
and moral affect. Third, our sharing measure was limited, as we had to change the object that 
was shared from T2 to T3 to keep the task age-appropriate. Nevertheless, the sharing patterns 
were in line with previous studies, reducing the risk of systematic bias. Fourth, our assessment of 
guilt and moral reasoning was limited to the prosocial omission domain, and future research is 
warranted to explore if and how emotions and reasoning in other moral domains (e.g., fairness) 
relate to prosocial behaviors. Additionally, although our guilt and moral reasoning measures 
were derived from separate questions, they were not completely independent since they were 
obtained from the same vignettes. Fifth, some of our effects were small, indicating that various 
other unexplored factors may underlie children’s motivation to behave prosocially. Sixth, 
although our study examined children’s sympathy, guilt/sadness, moral reasoning, and prosocial 
behaviors using various methods and informants, it would have been beneficial to apply an even 
more comprehensive multi-method, multi-informant approach to examine each variable. For 
example, sharing was measured with a behavioral task while helping and cooperation were not. 
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This behavioral task for sharing was utilized specifically so that the current study could capture 
high-cost, private sharing with anonymous recipients, a context that more closely reflects the 
individual’s altruistic intentions than public acts of sharing (Ongley & Malti, 2014). As such, 
private acts of sharing may not easily be adequately captured with parent- and teacher-reports, 
and so the contextual constraints of this type of sharing necessitated different methods than the 
measurement of helping and cooperation. We acknowledge that this is a limitation of the current 
study, however. Future studies would benefit from employing multiple measurements for each 
type of examined prosocial behavior since one method is likely to only capture a fragment of the 
complexity inherent in such actions. Lastly, children's sympathy was rated by different teachers 
at T1 and T2. Although we did not model the mean-level development of sympathy over time 
(which would have been more sensitive to the effects of this undesirable variability), we 
recognize that this issue may have introduced additional sources of variability. 
In summary, the current findings extend prior research on moral emotions and moral 
reasoning in the development of children’s various subtypes of prosocial behaviors across middle 
childhood. The implications of this study are that it is not only important to study how sympathy 
relates to overt prosocial behavior over time but to understand how other emotional experiences 
and justifications in the context of prosocial moral conflict may similarly or uniquely motivate 
children to help, cooperate, and share. These findings point to the need of incorporating 
strategies that target both other-oriented and self-oriented moral emotions and differentiated 
reasoning about moral conflicts into existing efforts to promote varied and multiple prosocial 
behaviors in children.  
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Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Bivariate Correlations of Sympathy, Guilt/Sadness, and Moral Reasoning with Prosocial Behaviors 
      Helping   Cooperation   Sharing 
  Mean (SD)          T1  T2   T3   T1 T2 T3   T1 T2 T3 
Sex   --    --  .05   .19*   .30*** 
 
.11   .30***   .13 
 
 .18*     .14  .09 
SES 54.77 (15.90)       -.11   .07   .14 
 
 .20*   .22*   .19* 
 
   .002     .11 -.08 
Sym (T) T1 4.55 (1.10)  .19   .21*   .39*** 
 
  .37**   .26*   .32** 
 
 - .11   - .13   .24*  
Sym (T) T2 4.50 (1.19)  .08   .12   .24** 
 
.09   .34***   .27** 
 
   .19*     .19*   .10 
Sym (C) T1 0.78 (0.54)  .10   .14   .13 
 
.16   .05   .14 
 
  .04   - .01   .05 
Sym (C) T2 1.56 (0.43)  .21*   .30**   .18* 
 
  .26**   .25**   .35*** 
 
  .003     .25**   .22* 
Guilt/Sadness 
T1 
0.69 (0.42)  .004   .18*   .10 
 
.06   .08   .15 
 
 - .09     .03   .08 
Guilt/Sadness 
T2 
0.80 (0.36)  .09   .20*   .09 
 
  .26**   .08    .01 
 
 - .14     .22*   .18* 
MR T1 0.28 (0.21)  .04   .01   .08 
 
.15 - .07   - .08 
 
 - .11   - .13 -.04 
MR T2 0.33 (0.17)      - .02 - .02   .08   .11   .03   - .04      .003   .001   .08 
Mean 
  
   4.96  4.91  4.71 
 
 4.99  5.05    5.26 
 
 0.44     0.48  0.44 
(SD)        (0.78) (0.88)  (0.88)    (0.75) (0.74)   (0.56)    (0.17)   (0.08) (0.14) 
Note. Sym = Sympathy; T = Teacher report; C = Child report; MR = Moral reasoning; T1 = Time 1; T2 = Time 2; T3 = Time 3. Sex 
was coded as 1 = male and 2 = female. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
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Table 2 
Latent Curve Modeling Predicting Initial Levels and Change in Helping and Cooperation by Sympathy, Guilt/Sadness, and Moral 
Reasoning  
 
Helping  Cooperation 
 Intercept Slope  Intercept Slope 
Unconditional Mean = 4.96**  Mean = -0.11**   Mean = 4.97** Mean = 0.14** 
 Variance = 0.38**  Variance = 0.08   Variance = 0.40** Variance = 0.07* 
Conditional Helping  Cooperation 
 
T1 predictors T2 predictors  T1 predictors T2 predictors 
Model Series 1 Intercept Slope Intercept Slope  Intercept Slope Intercept Slope 
Intercept     ─  - .32   ─    .23  ─  - .74***  ─ - .28 
Sex    .02    .38*  .29**    .47  .05    .09  .16   .16 
SES  - .13    .20  .02    .23  .18*    .01  .19*   .06 
Sym (T)    .26*    .25*  .11  - .16  .36**    .19  .14   .13 
Guilt/Sadness     .13    .09  .13  - .15  .14    .11  .16 - .31* 
Sym (T)  
Guilt/Sadness      ─    ─  ─    ─ 
 
.04  - .23**  ─   ─ 
R2    .08    .39  .15    .34  .22    .53  .16   .22 
Model Series 2 Intercept Slope Intercept Slope  Intercept Slope Intercept Slope 
Intercept     ─  - .27  ─   .30   ─ - .74**  ─ - .35 
Sex  - .01    .36  .32**   .42   .06   .09  .19   .11 
SES  - .13    .22  .04   .22   .19*   .04  .23*   .01 
Sym (T)    .26*    .25*  .09 - .09   .34*   .12  .15   .14 
MR    .07    .02 - .01   .07   .17 - .12  .01 - .10 
Sym (T)  MR    ─    ─    ─    ─   ─   ─   ─   ─ 
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R2    .07    .36  .14   .42   .23   .52  .16   .13 
Table 2 (Cont’d) 
Model Series 3 Intercept Slope Intercept Slope  Intercept Slope Intercept Slope 
Intercept   ─ - .41**  ─   .15    ─ - .64**  ─ -.29 
Sex   .06   .38**  .25**   .49    .09   .12  .14  .18 
SES - .07   .15  .03   .31    .29**   .08  .21*  .10 
Sym (C)   .09   .01  .25* - .04    .09   .02  .32**  .29 
Guilt/Sadness   .01   .15  .12 - .13  - .01   .14  .16  -.35** 
Sym (C)  
Guilt/Sadness   ─   ─  ─   ─ 
 
- .21*  .01  ─   ─ 
R2   .02   .37  .17   .42    .15   .39  .23  .24 
Model Series 4 Intercept Slope Intercept Slope  Intercept Slope Intercept Slope 
Intercept    ─ - .37    ─   .21    ─ - .59**   ─ - .34 
Sex   .04   .37*   .25**   .46    .08  .10   .17   .15 
SES -  .10   .13   .05   .28    .24*   .04   .23*   .08 
Sym (C)  .10   .03   .28** - .07    .11   .03   .35**   .21 
MR  .06   .03 - .10   .12    .09 - .10 - .08 -.15 
Sym (C)  MR    ─   ─   ─   ─  -.17*   .11   ─   ─ 
R2    .02   .30   .16   .44    .13   .40   .23   .12 
Note. Sym = Sympathy; T = Teacher report; C = Child report; MR = Moral reasoning; T1 = Time 1; T2 = Time 2. All estimates were 
standardized coefficients for the conditional LGC models. Non-significant interaction terms were removed from the final models.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01.  






Figure 1. The interaction of sympathy and guilt/sadness at T1 predicting the slope of 
cooperation. Dotted lines represent non-significant effects (p >.05). 
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Figure 2. The interaction of (a) sympathy and guilt/sadness and (b) sympathy and moral 
reasoning in predicting the intercept of cooperation at T1. Dotted lines represent non-significant 
effects (p >.05). 
































b = .34, p = .01
































b = .39, p = .04
b = -.08, p = .63
(b) 
(a) 
